



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM  
S/S

TOP SECRET/RUFF/UMBRA/GAMMA

April 3, 1981 - 1615

TO: The Secretary  
FROM: INR - Ronald I. Spiers *RIS (ad)*  
SUBJECT: Poland: Soviet Military Options

SUMMARY: Soviet and Warsaw Pact military actions in and around Poland have continued after the reduction of internal tensions and the emergence in the past few days of a moderate alliance of the Polish union-party-government establishments. Whatever the Soviets' immediate intentions may be, the environment in Poland for possible military action has changed significantly.

DISCUSSION: Combining the new Polish internal political situation and the present Pact military posture, we can envisage a wide variety of scenarios. The Soviets could:

- continue SOYUZ-81 to intimidate Solidarity and bolster the present leadership while it and Solidarity implement the agreement signed last Monday; {POSSIBLY ALREADY UNDER WAY}
- introduce additional Soviet military units as a price for not intervening now; {POSSIBLY ALREADY UNDER WAY}
- force Jaruzelski and Kania into declaring martial law, including a severe crackdown on the unions. This would be contrary to a milder version of martial law that Jaruzelski would prefer in order to pre-empt Soviet intervention. {COULD OCCUR AT ANY TIME}
- use the threat of military intervention as a way of forcing the resignations of Jaruzelski and Kania in favor of a regime which could be relied upon to collaborate in a future Soviet intervention. {COULD OCCUR AT ANY TIME}

Some of the military activity, however, is taking place behind Jaruzelski's back. This suggests a more sinister scenario in which the Soviets engineer a coup against Jaruzelski to lessen resistance to an intervention by paralyzing the Polish army and government. {SOVIETS MAY BE LAYING GROUNDWORK; COULD OCCUR IN A DAY}

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State Dept. review completed

If Jaruzelski were to learn of an impending intervention in time, he would probably declare a state of emergency and deploy Polish army and militia forces in hopes that Moscow would then abandon its plan.

Alternatively, the present military activities could be the beginning of preparations for a massive invasion, designed to overwhelm what Moscow may now see as the prospect of determined and united resistance by the Polish regime, including the army, and people. {WOULD REQUIRE CLOSE TO A WEEK}

ALL OF THE ABOVE CONTINGENCIES COULD TAKE SUBSTANTIALLY LONGER PERIODS THAN THE MINIMUMS SPECIFIED ABOVE.

#### Polish Reaction - Government

Kania's options, however, are very limited, caught as he is between conflicting demands from within (including the party) and without. These options may be:

- yielding to pressure for the "temporary" stationing of additional Soviet troops in Poland;
- declaring a state of national emergency, which would include a severe crackdown on the unions; (this would contrast with a milder version that Jaruzelski is believed to prefer in order to pre-empt a Soviet intervention) and
- either collaborate in inviting Soviet military assistance or resign.

#### Polish Reaction - Popular

- The popular Polish reaction will be influenced by the extent and manner of the Soviet military intervention, whether or not the Soviet military units are kept in isolated training areas or deployed around and in cities and on their behavior.
- Also of crucial significance will be whether the introduction of Soviet troops will be officially presented to the public as part of a joint military maneuver or whether official Warsaw announces that the troops entry was without prior

In any event, if the Soviet troops are not kept within training areas and act in a hostile manner the Solidarity Union will likely;

- stage a sit-down occupation strike of factories,
- damage factory equipment to bring production to a halt,
- remove street and road signs and house numbers to confuse the Soviets, and
- place Solidarity leaders and their key supporters under the protection of workers guards.

The Polish Army's behavior is problematical at this time.

Soviet Intervention Imminent

USG Statement

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The United States is watching closely developments in the USSR and Eastern Europe which indicate the Soviet Union is preparing to intervene militarily in Poland in the near future.

The United States is consulting with its allies and other nations on the current situation, which must be regarded with utmost seriousness.

The Soviet Union is well aware of the views of the United States with respect to Poland. Poland can and must be allowed to resolve its internal difficulties without outside interference of any kind. The consequences of Soviet intervention for East-West relations and the international environment in general would be serious and lasting.

In light of these developments Secretary Haig has deferred his imminent departure for the Middle East.